Emergency Planning – Week # 1 Lecture 1

The Historical Context of Emergency Management

Emergency management is an ancient discipline that deals with risk and risk avoidance.  Risk represents a broad range of issues and includes an equally diverse set of players.  The range of situations that could possibly involve emergency management or the EM system is extensive. This supports the premise that emergency management is integral to the security of everyone’s daily lives and should be integrated into daily decisions and not just called on during times of disaster.

Understanding the history and evolution of emergency management is important because at different times, the concepts of emergency management have been applied differently.  Unlike other more structured disciplines, EM has expanded and contracted in response to events, congressional desires, and leadership styles.  The following list details the evolution of emergency management to the present day.

Early History: 1800-1950

The first federal involvement in disaster management appears with an 1803 Congressional act to provide financial assistance to a New Hampshire town.  During the 1930s, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Bureau of Public Roads make disaster loans available for public facilities, and the Tennessee Valley authority is created to reduce flooding (in addition to generating electricity).  The Flood Control Act of 1934 gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority to design and build flood control projects.  

The Cold War and the Rise of Civil Defense: 1950s

The threat of nuclear war and its consequences spurs the creation of Civil Defense programs throughout the country.  The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) is created to support state and local civil defense directors, bringing the concept of emergency management to every community.  The Office of Defense Mobilization, which eventually merges with the FCDA, is established to produce, stockpile, and transport emergency supplies and effectively creating emergency preparedness.  Congressional response to disasters during this period continue to be ad hoc and primarily involves financial assistance to affected areas.

Natural Disasters Bring Changes to Emergency Management: 1960s

everal major disasters result in significant human and financial losses.  Hurricane Betsy, in particular, spurs the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, effectively creating the National Flood Insurance Program and introducing the concept of community-based mitigation. However, the voluntary insurance program was not meeting expectations for the reduction of federal relief expenditures.  In 1972, NFIP participation was linked to homeowner loans, and the program’s efficacy rises significantly. However, emergency management continues to evolve in a fragmented manner. 

The Call for a National Focus to Emergency Management: 1970s

The disaster relief act of 1974 gives HUD the greatest EM authority, though EM functions exist concurrently in several other federal agencies. Under President Carter, with strong state support and following the accident at Three Mile Island, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was created in 1978.  Under FEMA, the majority of federal EM tasks were consolidated.  However, FEMA’s first years were marked by a resistance to such integration.

Civil Defense Reappears as Nuclear Attack Planning: 1980s

During the Reagan administration, FEMA’s top priority was nuclear attack preparedness. Statutory authority steadily moved from the state to the federal level, and funding for state and local programs decreased.  The threat of the New Madrid fault leads to the creation of the Federal Response Plan, which later becomes the operating Bible for all federal agencies’ response operations.

An Agency in Trouble: 1989-1992

FEMA at the end of the 1980s is an agency suffering from morale problems, disparate leadership, and conflicts with its state and local partners.  Inadequate responses to several major disasters called the Agency’s existence into question, and the GAO demanded reform.  President Clinton, who had response experience during his Arkansas Governorship, recognized FEMA's value and set out early in his term to reinvigorate the agency. 

The Witt Revolution: 1993-2001

James Lee Witt, the first FEMA director with prior EM experience, recognized the value of cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies.  Witt’s sweeping reforms of FEMA restored American’s trust in the agency, and created a stronger partnership with the state and local agencies, and with Congress, other federal agencies, and the media.  Successful response to an unprecedented series of disasters proved FEMA’s worth and helped to eliminate ineffective, antiquated legacy policies.  

President Clinton affirmed FEMA’s value by elevating the position of director into the Cabinet. Witt’s term was marked by many important EM initiatives and legislation, including Project Impact, and FEMA was ultimately recognized as the world leader in EM (despite what some analysts see as a failure to secure authority for terrorism response following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing).  EM as a profession was evolving such that it became a respected, challenging, and sought-after profession. 

Terrorism Becomes Major Focus: 2001

James Allbaugh is presented with an early challenge as FEMA director when, immediately after eliminating funding for the Project Impact program, the Nisqually Earthquake struck and PI is credited for the very low disaster consequences.  Project Impact regained its funding, but Allbaugh’s next major action was to reinstate the Office of National Preparedness which was created in the 1980’s to plan for World War III.  

While the decision raised concerns, the agency assured that ONP's focus was terrorism response. The need for such a program was validated on the morning of September 11th, when terrorists struck multiple targets in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania.  The attacks required full activation of the Federal Response Plan, and the strength of the system was proven as hundreds of response personnel initiated operations within minutes of the events.  

The Creation of the Department of Homeland Security: 2001–2005

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the President created, by executive order, the Office of Homeland Security. The office had only 120 employees, and a prohibitively small budget. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) was signed in March of 2002, which stated that the Nation required a Homeland Security Advisory System to disseminate information regarding terrorism risk.  On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and named former PA Governor Tom Ridge as secretary of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that was created as result.  

The new department joined together over 179,000 federal employees from 22 existing federal agencies under a single, cabinet-level organization. On February 16, 2005, Michael Chertoff was unanimously confirmed by the Senate to succeed Ridge in leading DHS. Soon after, Chertoff announced he would be reorganizing DHS to better manage the organization. As part of the proposed reorganization, virtually all of the remaining preparedness capabilities in FEMA were moved to a new Office of Preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus exclusively on response and recovery, leaving a situation similar to what existed before FEMA’s 1979 creation when Federal emergency management and disaster assistance capabilities were scattered across the Federal government and in the White House. 

The Hurricane Katrina Debacle 2005

A disaster exercise termed “Hurricane Pam” was convened and completed in July 2004, with appropriate follow up requirements to correct the problems and deficiencies discovered during the exercise recorded (though funding to support these actions was reallocated to support other DHS priorities).  The specific danger from Katrina became clear on August 26, when National Hurricane Center and National Weather Service forecasters saw the storm turn west. Warnings to emergency management officials began immediately, and President Bush declared a disaster in advance of the event in the projected impact zone.  

But, however vigorous the preparations, ineffective leadership, poor advance planning, and an unwillingness to devote sufficient resources to emergency management over the long term doomed them to fail when Katrina struck. While Katrina’s destructive force could not be denied, state and local officials did not marshal enough of the resources at their disposal.  Adding to these shortfalls, years of inadequate funding of federal, state and local emergency functions left them incapable of fully carrying out their missions to protect the public and care for victims.  

More than 1,800 people died, and tens of thousands were displaced.  Failure can be assessed at all levels, but when President Bush signed the Federal declaration of disaster and announced it in the Rose Garden, before Katrina actually made land fall, the Federal government through DHS/FEMA took the primary responsibility for the stewardship of the response to this storm’s aftermath.  And by any objective evaluation of the response, it was a colossal failure.

The Lead up to the Katrina Debacle 

FEMA’s Katrina failures were predictable for a number of reasons.  First, following September 11, FEMA lost its status as an independent agency and its direct access to the president.  Second, FEMA personnel and funds, including money for preparedness and mitigation intended for state and local agencies, were redistributed to support other higher priorities within DHS. Third, the federal response plan was restructured into the National Response Plan to accommodate the new DHS arrangements and the operational oversight role of the department’s secretary.  A fourth factor was the dramatic post–September 11 change from a focus on “all-hazards” management—in which responders prepare for calamities according to plans that apply regardless of their precise nature—to a focus on terrorism that led to significantly weakened national capabilities. A final factor is the political philosophy of the Administration that emergency management was a State and local issue.  

Post-Katrina Changes

In the rush to examine and investigate what went wrong, and take corrective actions, the US Congress engaged in extensive hearings and investigations.  The Administration’s Report, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” was released in February 2006.  It was a weighty document, and included 125 recommendations and 11 critical actions that needed to be completed by June 1, the start of the 2006 hurricane season.  However, the report, just like the Hurricane Katrina event, reflected the Administration’s lack of understanding and lack of accountability for disaster response and recovery.  Supported by this and other reports and a public demanding action, the 109th Congress passed revised federal emergency management policies that vested more power in the President; reorganized FEMA; and enhanced and clarified the mission, functions, and authorities of DHS.

The Obama Administration Approach to Emergency Management

Barack Obama’s election represented a change from the past, including a change for emergency management.  While there had been discussion among staff of the new President about taking FEMA out of DHS, the confirmation of Janet Napolitano who strongly believed FEMA to be an essential part of DHS prevented any such action.  Craig Fugate, a former State Director of Emergency Management from Florida, was confirmed as FEMA Administrator, bringing excellent credentials and extensive operational experience to the position.  Administrator Fugate stated a desire to create a culture of preparedness as a hallmark of his FEMA tenure, and surrounded himself with a political team that includes several veterans of the 1990’s Witt years.  Moreover, Administrator Fugate is a strong supporter of rebuilding partnerships with State and local emergency management organizations.  Administrator Fugate and his team sought to reenergize the Agency, focusing on the following areas:

· Improving the response operations

· Incorporating all elements of social media – Facebook, twitter, blogs, etc.,  to communicate with the public before, during and after disasters

· Promoting their signature program concept of a Whole Community approach to emergency management.

· Limiting FEMA’s leadership role in Long Term recovery and mitigation

After a slow start in terms of major disasters, Administrator Fugate and his Agency have certainly been tested.  Two of the most significant disasters have included the Joplin tornadoes and Hurricane Sandy.  By all accounts, FEMA fared well in both Joplin and in the states impacted by Hurricane Sandy - though different areas have seen differing levels of support with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie offering praise and then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney hurling criticism.  Many long term recovery issues remain in the states impacted by Sandy, especially New York and New Jersey.  President Obama’s assignation of HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan to lead the Sandy Recovery, instead of Administrator Fugate or Secretary Napolitano, is a clear indication that FEMA may be shifting away from recovery other than to support it financially through the Disaster Relief Fund.  Sandy was also the first large scale use of the new National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), which has resulted in a host of issues that will need to be addressed.   

Also of note is that FEMA played virtually no role in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.  This is in dramatic contrast to the role FEMA played in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing and the 2011 World Trade Center event.  By all appearances, leadership at FEMA and DHS are slowly achieving their goal of being a preparedness and response organization, leaving the difficult decisions of recovery and building back better to some other Federal entity.